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Financial Newspapers have for long suggested that the Fed tends to provide additional Liquidity 
when the Stock Market thumbs. We provide a theoretical Explanation for this Behaviour that 
builds on the Methodology developed by Romaniuk (2008) for a central Banker with two main 
Goals, Output and Price stability. In this Paper, the Policymaker behaves as a Portfolio Manager 
who aims at stabilizing Output, Goods Prices, as well as Asset Prices. An optimal, Time-varying 
Interest Rate Rule is obtained as the Merton's (1971) continuous Time Solution to the Portfolio 
Manager's Problem. In a second Step, we infer the optimal Interest Rate Rule of a central Bank 
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L'article propose plusieurs estimations de la règle de Taylor de la Fed et met en relief sa réponse 
asymétrique par rapport aux prix des biens et des actifs. Une explication est apportée, en 
s'appuyant sur l'approche développée par Romaniuk (2008). Dans cette perspective, la règle de 
décision du banquier central apparaît comme la solution de Merton (1971) au problème du 
gestionnaire de portefeuille, en supposant que le banquier central assure la gestion de trois 
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RATE RULE: A FINANCIAL APPROACH
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Abstract
According to empirical evidence brought in by this paper, the Fed seems to respond stronger to positive
than to negative deviations in inﬂation from trend; it also presents an asymmetric response with respect to
asset prices. We provide a theoretical explanation that builds on the methodology developed by Romaniuk
(2008) for a central banker with two main goals, output and price stability. In this paper, the policymaker
behaves as a portfolio manager who aims at stabilizing output, goods prices, as well as asset prices. An
optimal, time-varying interest rate rule is obtained as the Merton’s (1971) continuous time solution to
the portfolio manager’s problem. In a second step, option terms are included in the interest rate rule, in
order to allow the central bank to react diﬀerently to positive and negative deviations of key variables
from their targets.
Keywords: optimal interest rate rule, portfolio choice, stochastic dynamic programming, Fed, asset
prices, options theory.
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Starting with the pioneering paper by Taylor (1993), it became the norm in monetary economics
to describe the central bank behavior by means of a simple interest rate rule. In such a framework,
the central bank is assumed to steer the main monetary instrument, in general a short-term interest
rate, depending on variations in variables assumed to have an impact on its main objectives. While
such an interest rate rule can easily be inferred from the data, it appears as much more diﬃcult
to determine the actual objectives of the central banker by merely observing such an estimated
rule. However, these intrinsic objectives can be related to the oﬃcial goals of the policymaker.
For instance, according to his statute, the US Fed must "conduct the nation’s monetary policy
by inﬂuencing the monetary and credit conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum em-
ployment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates". Unlike the European Central
Bank, whose oﬃcial mission sets almost exclusive emphasis on price stability, the Fed is expected
to strike an adequate balance between protecting employment and maintaining price stability.
The Fed has also been assigned an oﬃcial objective of "supervising and regulating banking
institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation’s banking and ﬁnancial system..." as
well as "maintaining the stability of the ﬁnancial system and containing systemic risk that may
arise in ﬁnancial markets". It is not clear however whether this latter goal should be achieved
only through regulation and supervision, or by active management of the interest rate.1
In general, top Fed oﬃcials have systematically denied that they have a direct goal of stabilizing
asset prices. Yet many observers — ﬁnancial newspapers but also a few economists — have noticed
that the Fed seems to reduce interest rates whenever the ﬁnancial market goes into troubles, while
no response is observed when asset prices go up. This asymmetric response was often referred
to by the popular press as the "Greenspan put", and tends to become now the "Bernanke put".
Indeed, during the current ﬁnancial crisis originated in the subprime mortgage market, the Fed has
reduced the target rate by one percentage point in the fourth quarter of 2007, at a period where
1 Asset prices have been for long a subject of controversy for monetary economists. The yet unsettled theoretical
debate turns around the question of whether the inclusion of asset prices into the interest rate rule of a central
banker would improve or not the overall stability of the economy. See for instance Bernanke and Gertler (1999) and
Bullard and Schaling (2002) for arguments against including asset prices, Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Romaniuk
(2006), for the opposite view.
1inﬂationary tensions were not negligible (oil prices kept on rising and the dollar was extremely
weak). A further reduction of 1.25 % has been decided during January 2008. Explanations for this
idiosyncratic behavior were worked out by Miller et al. (2002), Illing (2004) and Sauer (2007). In
general, in their models, the Fed would provide liquidity in order to prevent the ﬁnancial disruption
from taking its toll on output growth.
In this paper, we bring some additional empirical evidence that backs the assumptions accord-
ing to which the Fed interest rate rule seems to incorporate asset prices and presents asymmetric
responses to positive vs. negative goods and stock price variations. We then infer a Fed-suited
optimal interest rate rule, drawing on the original methodology developed by Romaniuk (2008).
She analyzed the optimization problem of a central banker who behaves like a two asset portfolio
manager aiming at stabilizing good prices and output. The solution builds on Merton (1971)’s
continuous time asset allocation problem. Here we extend this analysis, to take into account the
fact that the Fed has actually three main oﬃcial goals: price stability, output sustainability and
ﬁnancial stability. To assess ﬁnancial stability, the empirical analysis takes into account the stock
market index, and we refer to the same indicator in the theoretical analysis, knowing that several
variables may be used as a proxy for ﬁnancial stability (the bid-ask spread, house prices, etc.).
Another development undertaken in this paper is to analyze the decision rule of a central banker
which reacts in an asymmetric way to positive/negative deviation of the key variables from their
targets. For so doing, we ﬁrst show that these asymmetries can be mathematically translated into
options - calls and puts - to be included in the interest rate rule. The optimal portfolio rule for
a central bank conducting an asymmetric monetary policy is then obtained by solving a similar
Merton problem.
When compared with the existing economic methodology, which consists in inferring an optimal
interest rate rule à la Taylor (1993) from a simple model of the economy, assuming linear dynamics
for inﬂation and the output gap, and a quadratic objective function of the policymaker (Svensson,
1997; Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998), the ﬁnancial approach brings several improvements. First,
it is developed in a fairly more general setting: linear relations are no more imposed and the
parameters of the key variable dynamics can obey time-varying and complex formulations. Second,
2as the solution to a dynamic optimization problem, the rule evolves with the state of the economy,
which in turn depends on expectations, variances and covariances of variation rates in the key
variables. Third, the form of the optimal interest rate rule can be easily interpreted in the light of
well-known principles driving the portfolio manager’s behavior, such as the diversiﬁcation motive.
And last, as will be shown in this paper, the model is quite ﬂexible and can be easily adapted
to various economic contexts. We will focus here on two rules that seem to be the most relevant
for the Fed case: where the central bank has not only the goal of promoting employment and
maintaining price stability, but also aims at preserving ﬁnancial stability, and where the decision
rule is asymmetric with respect to deviations from predetermined targets.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides several estimates of the Fed
interest rate rule over the period 1971-2007. In Section 3, the portfolio manager model, such as
applied to a three-goal central banker, is solved for an optimal interest rate rule. In Section 4, the
policy rule is generalized to account for possible asymmetric responses of the central banker to
changes in main variables with respect to their predetermined targets. The last section concludes
the paper.
2 An empirical assessment of the Fed’s interest rate rule
In this section, we work out several estimates of the Fed’s interest rate rule in the interval 1971
Q1 - 2007 Q1. The general form writes:
rt = c + λrt−1 +( DUM80 + DUM90)AZ + εt, (1)
with r the short-term interest rate, λ is related to the speed of the adjustment2 , A is a vector of
coeﬃcients, and Z a vector of dependent variables that capture the three main goals of the Fed:
the inﬂation rate as a proxy for price stability, the output gap as a proxy for sustainable growth,
and the stock market index as a proxy for ﬁnancial stability. εt is an i.i.d. shock. Long-run
coeﬃcients are thus A/λ.
The main OLS results are displayed in Table 1. The dependent variable, FFRUSED, is the
quarterly average of the eﬀective federal funds rate.
2 Each quarter the Fed will close the gap between the actual and the desired interest rate by (1 − λ).
3Right hand side variables are :
• CPINSA is the inﬂation rate based on the US CPI, measured this quarter to the same
quarter of the previous year. Based on this series, we extract the HP trend from the in-
ﬂation series (CPINSA_HP) and calculate the gap between actual data and trend values:
CPIGAP=CPINSA-CPINSA_HP. We then create two other series, CPINSA_UP=max{0,
CPIGAP} and CPINSA_DWN=min{0, CPIGAP}. The former reports only the positive
deviations and takes the value zero for all negative deviations, the latter contains only the
negative deviations and takes the value zero for positive deviations.
• GDPGAP is the output gap, measured as the percent deviation in the output index with re-
spect to its HP trend. Based on this series, we generate two others: GDPGAP_UP=max{0,
GDPGAP} and GDPGAP_DWN=min{0, GDPGAP}.
• DSP500 is the variation in the Standard & Poors 500 stock market index (from this quar-
ter to the same quarter of previous year, in percent); we also split the main series into
DSP500_UP=max{0, DSP500} and DSP500_DWN=min{0, DSP500}.
• DUM80, DUM90 are dummy variables which take the value 1 for quarters after Q1 1980
(and respectively Q1 1990). Many observers suggested that the Fed operated a policy break
between 1979 and 1982 ; we also allowed for such a break in the nineties.
• FFRUSED(-1), the lagged interest rate, was introduced in order to capture the smoothing
eﬀect.
Many economists have documented breaks in the behavior of the Fed. In general experts tend
to agree on that a ﬁrst break occurred between 1979 and 1982, when Paul Volker adopted a very
aggressive anti-inﬂation policy (Meltzer, 2006; Orphanides, 2006). Less well documented, it seems
that another break occurred during the nineties, a period where the Fed gradually played down
the information conveyed by monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy (Friedman,
2006). In order to authorize such would-be structural breaks, we include in some of our estimates,
4as a multiplicative coeﬃcient of A, two dummy variables, DUM80, which takes the value one
after Q1 1980, and DUM90, which takes the value one after Q1 1990.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
C 0.049ns 0.381ns 0.184ns 0.542* 0.547* 0.446** 1.078***
FFRUSED(-1) 0.890*** 0.830*** 0.892*** 0.825*** 0.830*** 0.918*** 0.864***
DUM80*CPINSA(3) — 0.104** — 0.109** 0.103** — 0.192ns
DUM90*CPINSA(3) — -0.140** — -0.151** -0.147** — -0.666**
CPINSA(3) 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.114*** 0.120*** — —
CPINSA_UP(3) — — — — — 0.280** 0.278**
CPINSA_DWN(3) — — — — — -0.043ns 0.064ns
GDPGAP 0.205*** 0.217*** — — 0.195*** — —
GDPGAP_UP — — 0.155ns 0.247** — 0.189ns 0.147ns
GDPGAP_DWN — — 0.205*** 0.155ns — 0.188ns 0.169ns
DSP500(-1) 0.011** 0.009* — — — — —
DSP500_UP(-1) — — 0.004ns 0.001ns 0.001ns 0.001ns 0.001ns
DSP500_DWN(-1) — — 0.026* 0.026* 0.025* 0.026* 0.029*
R2a 0.932 0.936 0.930 0.933 0.933 0.926 0.929
DW 1.94 1.93 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.88 1.88
Legend: *** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. ns - non signiﬁcant
Table 1. Estimates of the Fed interest rate rule
Equation 1 in Table 1 is a standard forward-looking Taylor rule augmented by the variation
in the stock market. The smoothing coeﬃcient is 0.11, so the long-run coeﬃcient of inﬂation (β)
is equal to 0.124/0.11 = 1.13, while the long-run coeﬃcient of the output gap (γ) is 1.86.T h e
variation in the stock market has a long-run coeﬃcient θ =0 .011/0.11 = 0.1. It appears that, at
the ﬁrst sight, each time the stock market rises or falls by 10%, the Fed will increase/decrease the
interest rate by one percentage point. Equation 2 performs the same analysis, but the introduction
5of dummy variables multiplicative of the coeﬃcient of inﬂation allows to take into account possible
changes in the strictness of the anti-inﬂation policy. It turns out that in the eighties, the Fed
response to inﬂation deviations was quite strong (this is a well documented outcome); in the
nineties, a period of joint low inﬂation and high growth driven by large productivity gains, the
bank reacted less strongly to inﬂation deviations from target.
Dolado et al. (2005) have already put forward the asymmetric response of the Fed with
respect to inﬂation and the output gap. We also carry out several estimates where we distinguish
between the positive and the negative deviation of output from the HP trend, positive and negative
deviation of inﬂa t i o nf o r mt h eH Pt r e n da n db e t w e e np o s i t ive and negative variations in the stock
market. The estimates do not put forward a strong diﬀerence between the response of the bank
to positive and negative deviations of the GDP from its trend. At diﬀerence with Dolado et al.
(2005), who, in the case of the Fed (only) could not reject the assumption of a symmetric response
to inﬂation deviations, our estimates (Eq. 6 and 7 in Table 1) suggest that the Fed reacts much
stronger to upward deviations of inﬂa t i o nf r o mi t sH Pt r e n dt h a nt od o w n w a r dd e v i a t i o n s .
More important for our analysis, there is a sharp contrast between the relatively strong response
of the Fed to declines in the stock market and its "benign neglect" with respect to the stock market
rises. For instance, in Equation 5, with a smoothing coeﬃcient of 0.17, the long-term coeﬃcient
on the negative variation in the stock market is 0.025/0.17 = 0.147 ; whenever the stock market
declines by 10%, the Fed will reduce its interest rate by 1.5 percentage points. In the same
equation, the coeﬃcient on stock market positive variations is close to zero and not statistically
signiﬁcant. This outcome is robust across all our estimates (Eq. 3-7 in Table 1) and brings support
to the "Greenspan put" hypothesis.
We can turn now to the theoretical explanation for this behavior. In particular, we aim at
inferring an interest rate rule which takes into account the ﬁnancial stability goal.
63 Optimal monetary policy of a central bank concerned
with ﬁnancial stability
In his pioneering paper, Taylor (1993) surmised that the Fed’s interest rate rule can be described
as a linear function in the inﬂation rate and the output gap. We follow this line of reasoning
by assuming that the level of the monetary policy instrument r depends linearly on variables Xi





with λi the weight assigned by the policymaker to the variable Xi when choosing the value of r.
At diﬀerence with traditional literature that uses as relevant variables the deviations from normal
values, in this paper we follow the analysis of Romaniuk (2008) and work with variables in levels.
Ad i ﬀerence with that paper must however be emphasized: while Romaniuk (2008) assumed that
the interest rate level depends on two variables (the price index and output), we introduce here a
third key variable, asset prices, as approximated by the stock price index. By doing so, we take
into account the three main oﬃcial objectives of the Fed, which are: maintaining price stability
in the goods market, supporting growth and employment and guaranteeing ﬁnancial stability. In
our framework, we have i =1 ,2,3,w i t hX1 ≡ P, X2 ≡ Y and X3 ≡ S, P denoting the price
index, Y output and S the stock price. In what follows, we will continue to work with the general
setting given by Eq. (2), since it can be easily transposed to other monetary policy environments
than the one under scrutiny.3
>From a ﬁnancial perspective, it can be considered that the variable r is invested in the assets
Xi in the proportions δi(t) ≡
λi(t)Xi(t)
r(t)
,w i t h
N X
i=1










One here needs to deﬁne the variable Xi dynamics. The following stochastic diﬀerential equation
3 For example, one could think of a central bank interested in maintaining goods price stability only, which is
theoretically the case of the ECB (i =1 , X1 ≡ P), or of the one containing inﬂationary pressures and supporting
growth (i =1 ,2, X1 ≡ P, X2 ≡ Y ). The setting could also reﬂect the case of a central bank aiming at goods
price stability, maximum sustainable growth, ﬁnancial stability, yet also exchange rate stability. We then have
i =1 ,2,3,4,w i t hX1 ≡ P, X2 ≡ Y , X3 ≡ S and X4 = e, e denoting the exchange rate.
7(SDE) describes the evolution of the variable Xi:
dXi(t)=Xi(t)µXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + Xi(t)σXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (4)
where µXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) is deﬁned as a bounded function of t, Z and r, σXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) a bounded
(1×M) vector valued function of t, Z and r, B(t) an (M ×1)-dimensional Wiener process in RM,
Z(t) a (K × 1)-dimensional vector of state variables.
The dynamics of the N variables Xi can be written in a compacted form:
dX(t)=IXµX(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + IXσX(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (5)
with IX denoting an (N × N) diagonal matrix valued function of X(t) with Xi(t) as its i−th
diagonal element, µX(t,Z(t),r(t)) an (N × 1)-dimensional vector with µXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) as its
i−th element, σX(t,Z(t),r(t)) an (N × M) matrix valued function with σXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) as its
i−th element.
The evolution of the economy is aﬀected by K s t o c h a s t i cs t a t ev a r i a b l e s .W eh a v ej u s td e ﬁned
Z(t), the vector of state variables, as a (K × 1)-dimensional vector. It is assumed that the N
ﬁrst variables composing Z are X1, X2, ..., XN,a n dt h e(K − N) remaining components are
constituted by other stochastic variables inﬂuencing the main variable dynamics.
Z evolves according to the dynamics :
dZ(t)=IZµZ(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + IZσZ(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (6)
where IZ stands for a (K×K) diagonal matrix valued function of Z(t), µZ(t,Z(t),r(t)) a bounded
(K × 1) vector valued function of t, Z and r, σZ(t,Z(t),r(t)) a bounded (K × M) matrix valued
function of t, Z and r.4
One can now replace the Xi dynamics, as given by Eq. (4), in Eq. (3) to ﬁnally obtain:
dr(t)
r(t)
= δ(t)0µX(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + δ(t)0σX(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (7)
with δ an (N × 1) vector of the proportions of the r variation rate driven by the Xi variation
rates, and the prime (0) standing for a transpose.
4 The deﬁnition of the main variable and state variable dynamics is based on Lioui and Poncet (2003) and
Romaniuk (2007).
8The central bank aims at maximizing its expected intertemporal utility over the monetary







where Et stands for the expectation conditional on the information available at date t, T the
monetary policy horizon, U the utility function.
It is assumed that the utility function is strictly concave in r. It is increasing, and then
decreasing with respect to r. The utility maximum is deﬁned for the interest rate which minimizes
the deviations of the variables Xi from their targeted values.
The optimization program of the central bank thus is: maximize Eq. (8) with respect to δ,
subject to the constraints of the r and Z dynamics, as deﬁned by Eqs. (7) and (6) respectively.
The central bank optimization program is solved by applying the method of stochastic dynamic
programming.









with J strictly concave in r and twice diﬀerentiable with respect to r and Z.




with D the Dynkin operator.
The Dynkin of J is deﬁned by:
DJ = Jt + Jrrµr +
1
2






where subscripts on J denote partial derivatives, Σij ≡ σiσ0
j the covariance matrix of the variables
i and j,a n dt h er dynamics are considered in its general form dr
r = µrdt + σrdB.
Let us note that the dependence with respect to t, δ, r and Z has been omitted in the preceding
equation, for the ease of exposition purpose. From now on, we shall omit this kind of dependence,
except when a risk of confusion occurs.
9One needs now to replace in Eq. (11) the parameters of the r dynamics as given by Eq.
(7). By deriving the resulting DJ formulation with respect to δ,w eg e tt h es y s t e mo fﬁrst order
conditions:
0N = µXJrr + ΣXXδJrrr2 + ΣXZI0
ZJrZr (12)









The solution to this optimization program is made up of two terms: the speculative fund and the
state variable hedge fund.
As outlined by Romaniuk (2008) in the two-asset case (i.e. when the monetary policy in-
strument is set relative to inﬂation and output), the speculative fund is representative of the
traditional trade-oﬀ between risk and reward, or µ and σ: The fund absolute value increases
with the expected variation rate of the given asset, and decreases when its standard deviation
increases. Yet, as pointed out by Romaniuk (2008), there is an important diﬀerence between our
setting, characterizing the central bank decision, and the standard portfolio management setting:
Depending on whether an increase or a decrease in the interest rate is required, the sign of Jr is
positive or negative, so that the speculative fun dh a sa no p p o s i t es i g ni nt h e s et w oc a s e s . T h i s
leads to the conclusion that the central bank invests more heavily in the asset characterized by the
best risk-reward properties only when an interest rate increase is needed. When the state of the
economy calls for an interest rate decrease, the opposite behavior is chosen.
Romaniuk (2008) took into account the central bank objectives of goods price stability and
maximum sustainable growth. In this paper, in keeping with our empirical analysis, a third
objective is included - the central bank also aims at preserving the good functioning of the ﬁnancial
market, or, in other words, to guarantee ﬁnancial stability.
The ﬁrst issue to be raised are then the consequences of introducing this additional objective
on the portfolio behavior of the central bank. When incorporating a new asset in the portfolio, the
optimal solution of the optimization program is modiﬁed: All the portfolio proportions now take
account of the properties of the newly introduced asset, which are its risk-reward characteristics,
10and its covariance with the existing assets.
A second issue deserves an analysis: When is the introduction of a new term in the monetary
policy reaction function justiﬁed? From a theoretical ﬁnancial management perspective, the an-
swer sounds rather simple. A new asset should be introduced in a portfolio whenever its ﬁnancial
properties are interesting, i.e. when its risk - reward - correlation (with the already existing assets
in the portfolio) characteristics permit diversiﬁcation.
Yet the question of introducing or not a possible asset in the portfolio is asked only for assets
which can constitute a central bank objective. As a consequence, the ﬁnancial properties of the
given asset are far from being the only argument to be taken into account: If this were the case,
the central bank would be theoretically advised to determine its monetary policy instrument level
relative to a large number of assets. Provided that the former condition is met, i.e. the asset
under scrutiny can be considered as a central bank objective, when will its incorporation in the
monetary policy reaction function be justiﬁed? Here too the answer is straightforward: when its
ﬁnancial characteristics allow the policymaker to beneﬁt from portfolio diversiﬁcation.
4 Optimal monetary policy of a central bank with an asym-
metric reaction function
The empirical analysis has shown that the Fed tends to react stronger to stock market negative
variations, while it neglects positive variations. We also have shown that this asymmetry applies
to inﬂation deviations from target (but not to output deviations). In order to account for this
behavior, we introduce now an asymmetric monetary policy function where the central bank can
react diﬀerently to positive and negative deviations of the Xi variables with respect to their



















where Xi stands for the targeted level of the variable Xi. αi represents the proportion of the
positive deviation of Xi from target that is taken into account when ﬁxing the interest rate level.
Symmetrically, βi determines the impact of a negative deviation on the r level chosen by the
central bank.








in fact deﬁne the values of
a call and a put respectively, which are written on Xi,w i t hXi as the strike price. Let us denote


































where the variable r i sn o wi n v e s t e di nt h ea s s e t sXi in the proportions δi(t),i nt h ea s s e t sCXi in
the proportions θi(t) ≡
αi(t)CXi(t)
r(t)














The variable Xi dynamics, as well as the Z dynamics, have already been deﬁned. Let us now
formulate the CXi and PXi dynamics:
dCXi(t)=CXi(t)µCXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + CXi(t)σCXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (17)
dPXi(t)=PXi(t)µPXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + PXi(t)σPXi(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (18)
where µCXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) and µPXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) are deﬁned as bounded functions of t, Z and r,
σCXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) and σPXi(t,Z(t),r(t)) bounded (1 × M) vector valued functions of t, Z and r.
The compacted form of the dynamics of the N variables CXi and N variables PXi can be
written:
dCX(t)=ICXµCX(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + ICXσCX(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (19)
dPX(t)=IPXµPX(t,Z(t),r(t))dt + IPXσPX(t,Z(t),r(t))dB(t) (20)
with ICX and IPX denoting (N ×N) diagonal matrix valued functions of CX(t) and PX(t) respec-
tively, µCX(t,Z(t),r(t)) and µPX(t,Z(t),r(t)) (N ×1)-dimensional vectors, σCX(t,Z(t),r(t)) and
σPX(t,Z(t),r(t)) (N × M) matrix valued functions.






δ(t)0µX(t,Z(t),r(t)) + θ(t)0µCX(t,Z(t),r(t)) − η(t)0µPX(t,Z(t),r(t))
¤
dt (21)
+[δ(t)0σX(t,Z(t),r(t)) + θ(t)0σCX(t,Z(t),r(t)) − η(t)0σPX(t,Z(t)),r(t)]dB(t)
with θ and η (N ×1) vectors of the proportions of the r variation rate driven by the CXi and PXi
variation rates respectively.
The optimization program of the central bank becomes: maximize Eq. (8) with respect to δ,
θ and η, subject to the constraints of the r, Z, CX and PX dynamics, as deﬁned by Eqs. (21),
(6), (19) and (20) respectively.









with the Bellman optimality conditions given by:
0= m a x
{δ(t),θ(t),η(t)}
[U(r(t),Z(t),t)+DJ(r(t),Z(t),t)] (23)
the Dynkin of J being once again formulated as in Eq. (11).
Let us replace the parameters of the r dynamics, as given by Eq. (21), in Eq. (11). The
diﬀerentiation of the resulting DJ formulation with respect to δ, θ and η allows to obtain the
system of ﬁrst order conditions:
0N = µXJrr +( ΣXXδ + ΣXCXθ − ΣXPXη)Jrrr2 + ΣXZI0
ZJrZr (24)
0N = µCXJrr +( ΣCXCXθ + ΣCXXδ − ΣCXPXη)Jrrr2 + ΣCXZI0
ZJrZr
0N = −µPXJrr +( ΣPXPXη − ΣPXXδ − ΣPXCXθ)Jrrr2 − ΣPXZI0
ZJrZr























The three asset types - the underlying asset, the call and the put - have a comparable port-
folio structure. For each of them, four components form the optimal investment strategy: the
preference-dependent speculative fund, two preference-independent hedge funds against variations
of the two remaining portfolio asset types and a preference-dependent state variable hedge fund.
The main diﬀerence between the portfolio solutions for each asset type results from taking into
account the characteristics of the given asset class: µX, ΣXX and ΣXZ for the underlying asset
proportion, µCX, ΣCXCX and ΣCXZ for the call proportion, µPX, ΣPXPX and ΣPXZ for the put
proportion. One also observes that the signs of the η proportion are almost all opposite to the
ones characteristic of the δ and θ proportions, which is a natural consequence of subtracting the
puts in the r deﬁnition.
When compared with the solution structure in the "symmetric reaction function case" devel-
oped in the previous section, one notices the emergence of the two preference-independent hedge
funds against the variations of the two other asset classes.
The empirical estimates of the Fed’s interest rate rule showed an asymmetric response to
inﬂation and stock market deviations; more precisely, data emphasize a kind of overreaction by
the central bank to positive inﬂation deviations and to negative stock market deviations, while
underreaction characterized the opposite changes in these variables. These empirical properties
are consistent with our theoretical solution here-above if θP largely exceeds ηP, while θS is largely
lower than ηS. Very probably, the main culprit for such a dynamics is the speculative fund, since
it is likely to represent the predominant part of the optimal investment strategy. More precisely,
14it is probably the value of Jr, which itself is determined by the characteristics of the policymaker’s
utility function, that is at the origin of this form of asymmetric central bank reaction. One could
surmise that the Fed shows a higher aversion to inﬂation deviation increases and to stock market
deviation decreases than to opposite economic evolutions. As a consequence, the central bank
utility loss will be higher in the ﬁrst case than in the second one. This entails overreacting when
inﬂation rises above the targeted level or the stock market index decreases below the fundamental
value, while underreaction occurs in the case of inﬂation deviation decreases or stock market
deviation increases.
To conclude our analysis, the Fed’s asymmetric reaction to positive/negative key variable
variations is probably the consequence of asymmetric central bank preferences.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we argued that the "Greenspan put" or the provision of liquidity by the Fed in
periods of ﬁnancial turmoil is more a substantive phenomenon than the Fed oﬃcials do generally
admit. Our empirical analyses show that over a long period, the Fed would reduce the short-
term interest rate by 1.5 percentage point if the stock market declines by 10%, while it would
not rise an eyebrow when the stock market index goes up. The Fed also seems to react stronger
to positive inﬂation deviations than to negative inﬂation deviations from trend. We provide
an original theoretical modelling of this behavior, building on the portfolio manager problem
analyzed and solved by Merton (1971). Our theoretical model deﬁnes the optimal monetary
policy rule in two settings. Firstly, we extend the analysis of Romaniuk (2008) by including
ﬁnancial stability as a central bank objective. We put forward a time-varying optimal decision
rule that brings into the picture expectations, variances and covariances of the key variables. The
incorporation of the ﬁnancial market stability term in the reaction function can be justiﬁed from
a ﬁnancial management point of view if it allows to enhance portfolio diversiﬁcation. The rule was
then generalized to allow for asymmetric responses with respect to positive/negative key variable
variations in the conduct of monetary policy, by including option terms in the reaction function.
The resulting optimal decision rule is more complex, but the optimal portfolio structure remains
15essentially unchanged.
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